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Appellants, Lisa Hamilton Kunz, Stuart G. Hamiltonf 
Vincent C, Hamiltonf Amber Hamilton McKelvey and Tonua Hamilton 
(collectively the "Appellants") , pursuant to Rule 35, Utah Rules of 
Appellant Procedure, submit this Petition for Rehearing, and move 
that the Court grant a rehearing on Appellee's Motion for Summary 
Disposition. 
STATEMENT OF DISPUTE POINTS OF LAW 
AND/OR FACT 
1. Did the Court err as a matter of fact and law in 
concluding that "cohabitation" consists of two elements, "residency 
and sexual contact evidencing a conjugal association/" given the 
terminology found in the Antenuptial Agreement? 
The qualifying phrase of "any other person" eliminates 
any consideration of sexual contact. The Court's sole focus on the 
term "cohabit" in effect rewrites the Antenuptial Agreement. All 
of the terms of the Antenuptial Agreement are not being harmonized 
or given effect. The only relevant Haddow element is common 
residency. 
2. Did the Court err as a matter of fact and law in 
finding and concluding that the disputed phrase of " . . . cohabit 
therein with any other person" is unambiguous and therefore not 
subject to further interpretation through extrinsic evidence? 
The two terms of "cohabit" and "any other person" when 
taken together create an ambiguity. When an ambiguity exists, 
extrinsic evidence as to the parties7 interest must be received and 
considered; therefore, requiring the taking of evidence and the 
making of factual findings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Gordon Dean Hamilton and Appellee Mary M. Hamilton 
("Mary Hamilton") were married on September 26, 1986. Prior to the 
marriage, the parties entered into an Antenuptial Agreement dated 
September 26, 1986 (the "Antenuptial Agreement"). The Antenuptial 
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Agreement was ratified by Gordon Dean Hamilton's Last Will and 
Testament, dated December 7, 1989 (the "Will"). 
2. Gordon Dean Hamilton died January 17, 1990. Mary 
Hamilton is not a devisee under the Will. All of the residual 
property was devised to Gordon Dean Hamilton's five children from 
a previous marriage. Gordon Dean Hamilton's five children from a 
previous marriage constitute the Appellants in this case. 
3. The Antenuptial Agreement purports to grant a life 
estate to Mary Hamilton in the residence and building lot of the 
couple M . . . so long as she does not cohabit therein with any 
other person (emphasis added)." Gordon Dean Hamilton intended the 
phrase "cohabit therein with any other person" to mean that Mary 
Hamilton was not to have any person cohabit with her in the home. 
4. Mary Hamilton moved her daughter, son-in-law and 
family into the house on or about December 1, 1991. According to 
the terms of the Antenuptial Agreement, when Mary Hamilton's 
daughter
 f son-in-law and family moved into the house, Mary 
Hamilton's life estate terminated. 
5. Both the Appellants and the Appellees filed Motions 
for Summary Judgment, the trial court considered the motions and 
entered a Memorandum Decision on May 13, 1992 granting the 
Appellees' Motion for Summary Judgment. On July 8, 1992, the trial 
court entered an amended Memorandum Decision denying the 
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Appellants' Motion for Summary Judgment, On August 6, 1992, the 
trial court entered its Order Granting Summary Judgment which is 
the judgment being appealed. 
6. Appellees filed their Motion for Summary Disposition 
on September 25, 1992* Appellants filed their Response in 
Opposition to Appellees' Motion for Summary Disposition on October 
22, 1992. The Court of Appeals filed its Memorandum Decision (the 
"Memorandum Decision") on November 30, 1992, which decision the 
Appellants are petitioning for rehearing. 
ARGUMENT I 
THE QUALIFYING PHRASE OF "ANY OTHER PERSON" 
ELIMINATES ANY CONSIDERATION OF SEXUAL 
CONTACT; THEREFORE, THE ONLY RELEVANT 
HADDOW ELEMENT IS COMMON RESIDENCY. 
"[T]he term 'cohabitation' does not lend itself to a 
universal definition that is applicable in all settings . . . [T]o 
some extent, the meaning of the term depends upon the context in 
which it is used." Haddow v. Haddow, 707 P.2d 669, 671 (Utah 
1985). The term "cohabit" can have more than one meaning. 
Webster's has two different definitions for the term "cohabit": 
1. To live together as husband and wife; and 2. To live together 
(emphasis added). Webster's New World Dictionary 276 (1982). The 
determination of whether a given set of circumstances constitutes 
cohabitation requires the application of the terminology found in 
a document to a given said of facts. Haddow, supra, at 671. 
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The Supreme Court in Haddow construed language which was 
found in the parties' Divorce Decree which stated that the former 
wife was to pay the former husband one-half of the equity in the 
parties' home in which she was living if she moved out, remarried, 
or "cohabited with a male person (emphasis added)." In construing 
the Divorce Decree in Haddow, the Supreme Court decided that there 
are two key elements to be considered in determining whether 
cohabitation existed: common residency and sexual contact 
evidencing a conjugal relationship. Haddow, supra. at 674 (which 
this Court used in its Memorandum Decision) . The obvious thrust of 
the terminology found in the Divorce Decree in Haddow was that a 
sexual relation was part of the intended definition. However, the 
set of facts and terminology found in this case are very different 
than those found in Haddow. 
The terminology used in the Antenuptial Agreement is that 
Mary Hamilton's life estate shall be terminated if she " . . . 
cohabit[s] therein with any other person (emphasis added)." The 
obvious thrust of the phrase "any other person" eliminates any 
consideration of sexual contact. By eliminating any consideration 
of sexual contact, the only relevant element to be considered under 
the Haddow test is whether common residency exists. 
The elimination of any consideration of sexual contact is 
bolstered after an examination of the intent of the parties. The 
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meaning of the term "cohabitation" depends upon the context on 
which it is used and that the intent of the parties should be 
preserved. Haddow, supra, at 674. The cardinal rule in construing 
a contract is to give effect to the intentions of the party, and if 
possible, these intentions should be gleaned from an examination of 
the text of the contract itself. Buehner Block Co. v. U.W.C. 
Assoc, 752 P.2d 892 (Utah App. 1989); G.G.A., Inc. v. Leventis, 
773 P.2d 841 (Utah 1989). The qualifying language of "any other 
person" is very clear. "Any other person" is not limited to mean 
only to live with a male person, an unrelated male or as husband 
and wife. "Any other person" means just that, that if Mary 
Hamilton lives with any other person, then her life estate is 
terminated. 
The terminology in the Antenuptial Agreement, when read 
together, comports with Webster's second definition of "cohabit" 
(i.e. to live together). The Court in its Memorandum Decision 
states that "[i]f Mr. Hamilton had intended that Mary Hamilton's 
life estate terminate under the circumstances of this case, he 
could and should have used a term other than 'cohabit'. . . . " By 
simply focusing in on the term cohabit, the Court has completely 
ignored the qualifying language of "any other person." "A contract 
should be interpreted so as to harmonize all of its terms and 
provisions, and all of its terms should be given effect if 
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possible." G.G.A. Inc., supra, at 854 (citations omitted). 
Therefore, by ignoring the qualifying language after cohabit, the 
court has not interpreted the Antenuptial Agreement as to harmonize 
all its terms and provisions and in essence has rewritten the 
Agreement. Hal Taylor Associates v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 
743 (Utah 1982) (A court will not rewrite a contract.). 
The Supreme Court in Haddow defined common residency as 
" . . . the sharing of a common abode that both parties consider 
their principle domicile for more than a temporary or brief period 
of time." Haddow, supra, at 672. The Supreme Court also discussed 
common residency factors which aid in the determination of a 
finding of common residency. Haddow, supra, at 673. The trial 
court did not examine or make findings of fact and conclusions of 
law whether common residency or factors of common residency 
existed. The Appellees admit that the Fergusons have moved into 
the home with Mary Hamilton. That, in and of itself, is 
sufficient to terminate Mary Hamilton's life estate. 
The phrase "any other person" eliminates any 
consideration of sexual contact in determining whether Mary 
Hamilton's life estate should be terminated. This Court's focus on 
the term "cohabit" in effect rewrites the Antenuptial Agreement. 
All of the terms of the Antenuptial Agreement are not being 
harmonized or given effect. The only relevant Haddow element is 
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common residency* This Court's determination should be whether 
Mary Hamilton's admission of moving her family into the home 
constitutes common residency or whether the case should be remanded 
to the trial court to make findings of fact and conclusions of law 
whether common residency or factors of common residency existed. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE TERMINOLOGY FOUND IN THE ANTENUPTIAL AGREEMENT 
CREATES AN AMBIGUITY; THEREFORE, EXTRINSIC 
EVIDENCE AS TO INTENT MUST BE RECEIVED AND 
CONSIDERED, REQUIRING THE TAKING OF EVIDENCE AND THE 
MAKING OF FACTUAL FINDINGS. 
"A contract is considered ambiguous if 'the words used to 
express the meaning and intention of the parties are insufficient 
in a sense that the contract may be understood to reach two or more 
plausible meanings'." C.J. Realty, Inc. v. Willev, 758 P.2d 923 
(Utah App. 1988) (citations omitted). See also Saunders v. Sharp, 
197 Utah Adv. Rep. 25 (1992). In this case, there are two terms 
"cohabit" and "any other person." The two terms taken together, 
may be understood to reach two or more plausible meanings; 
therefore, an ambiguity exists. 
According to the trial court, the term cohabit means "to 
live together as husband and wife." According to this Court, the 
term cohabit means "common residency and sexual contact evidencing 
a conjugal association." However, the second term, "any other 
person," has not been defined by either court. If the ordinary and 
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usual meaning is attached to the second term, the qualifying 
language of "any other person" is very clear. The ordinary and 
usual meaning of "any other person" is just that, any other person. 
If the definition of "cohabit" is dependent upon the context in 
which it is used, then no ambiguity exists, and any consideration 
of sexual contact is eliminated. (See Argument I, above.) 
If the trial court's and this Court's definitions are 
applied to the term "cohabit," then an ambiguity exists. If the 
Antenuptial Agreement is ambiguous, then extrinsic evidence as to 
the parties' intent must be received and considered in an effort to 
glean what the parties actually agreed to. This requires the 
taking of evidence and the making of factual findings. C.J. 
Realty, supra, at 929. See also John Call Engineering v« Manti 
City Corp.. 743 P.2d 1205 (Utah 1987) (The intentions of the 
parties to a contract are controlling, and generally those 
intentions will be found in the instrument itself. However, if a 
writing is not sufficient to establish meaning, resort may be had 
to extraneous evidence manifesting the intentions of the parties. 
Id. at 1207). 
If a husband and wife relationship or sexual contact is 
required, then an ambiguity exists. The two terms taken together 
may be understood to reach two or more plausible meanings. 
Extrinsic evidence as to the parties7 interest must be received and 
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considered, requiring the taking of evidence and the making of 
factual findings. 
CONCLUSION 
The term cohabit can have more than one meaning; 
therefore, the qualifying language is required to determine the 
meaning and the intent of the parties. The qualifying language 
found in the Antenuptial Agreement of " . . . any other person" is 
clear. If the term "cohabit" is harmonized and given effect with 
the qualifying language, then any consideration of sexual contact 
is eliminated. The only determination is whether common residency 
existed when Mary Hamilton moved her family into the house. If the 
Court attaches the sterile definition that the term cohabit means 
"to live together as husband and wife" or that both prongs of the 
Haddow test apply, than an ambiguity exists. If an ambiguity 
exists, then extrinsic evidence must be received and considered and 
findings of fact are required to be taken. The undersigned counsel 
hereby certifies in conformity with Rule 35(a), Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, that this Petition for Rehearing is made in 
good faith and not for delay. 
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ADDENDUM 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
Lisa Hamilton Kunz; Stuart G. 
Hamilton; Vincent C. Hamilton; 
Amber Hamilton McKelvey; and 
Tonua Hamilton, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
Mary M. Hamilton; Susan 
Ferguson; and Andrew Ferguson, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Fourth District, Utah County 
The Honorable Ray M. Harding 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No, 920692-CA 
F I L E D 
(November 30, 1992) 
N0V3 01382 
Mary T Noonan 
Clerk of the Court 
Attorneys: 
,Ut*h C'^ °* Appeals 
James R. Brown, Salt Lake City, for Appellants 
Dallas H. Young, Provo, for Appellees 
Before Judges Jackson, Bench, and Garff (Law & Motion). 
PER CURIAM: 
This matter is before the court on defendants' motion for 
summary disposition. We summarily affirm. 
Plaintiffs filed this action seeking to terminate defendant 
Mary Hamilton's life estate in real property devised to 
plaintiffs by Gordon Hamilton. The trial court granted summary 
judgment in favor of defendants and plaintiffs appealed. 
Plaintiffs contend that defendant Mary Hamilton's life 
estate in the residence she shared with Gordon Hamilton prior to 
his death terminated when she allowed her daughter and son-in-
law, the other defendants, to move into the residence with her. 
Mary Hamilton's life estate in the property apparently derives 
from two sources, an antenuptial agreement and Gordon Hamilton's 
will.1 The antenuptial agreement provides, with respect to the 
subject residence, that "In the event, however, that Gordon 
predeceases Mary, it is the intent of the parties that she be 
1. Plaintiffs dispute that any devise was made to Mary Hamilton 
by Gordon Hamilton's will. That dispute is the subject of a 
separate appeal. 
given a life estate in the residence and building lot so long as 
she does not cohabit therein with any other person." The will 
ratifies the antenuptial agreement and further provides that the 
residence is bequeathed to plaintiffs "subject to a life estate 
my wife Mary M. Hamilton who [sic] shall have unless she 
remarries." 
Both sides rely exclusively on the antenuptial agreement 
with respect to the existence of Mary Hamilton's life estate. 
The antenuptial agreement is a contract and is construed 
according to the general rules of contract construction. 
Therefore, "we examine the language of the contract itself first, 
*and unless there is some ambiguity or uncertainty, there is no 
justification for attempting to vary it by extrinsic or parol 
evidence.'" Stevenson v. First Colony Life Ins. Co., 827 P.2d 
973, 979 (Utah App. 1992) (quoting Williams v. First Colony Life 
Ins. Co., 593 P.2d 534, 536 (Utah 1979)). In this case, 
plaintiffs argue that the phrase "cohabit therein with any other 
person" is ambiguous, and seek to offer extrinsic evidence 
regarding Gordon Hamilton/s intent with respect to that phrase. 
Relying on Haddow v. Haddow. 707 P.2d 669 (Utah 1985), the 
trial court found the disputed phrase to be unambiguous and 
therefore not subject to further interpretation through parol 
evidence. We agree. The Haddow court, while noting that the 
term is generally defined as "[t]o live together as husband and 
wife," held that "cohabitation" consists of two elements, "common 
residency and sexual contact evidencing a conjugal association." 
Id. at 671-72. 
We note that the antenuptial agreement was prepared by an 
attorney in 1986, after the Haddow case was issued. If Mr. 
Hamilton had intended that Mary Hamilton's life estate terminate 
under the circumstances of this case, he could and should have 
used a term other than "cohabit," which has been defined by the 
supreme court of this state to mean something other than that 
asserted by plaintiffs to have been Gordon Hamilton's intent.2 
We conclude that the contract is unambiguous and does not 
terminate Mary Hamilton's life estate under the undisputed facts 
2. The will, although not relied upon by the parties, also 
appears to support the Haddow definition of cohabitation, by 
specifying that the life estate created by the antenuptial 
agreement continues "unless [Mary Hamilton] remarries." 
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of this case. The trial court's grant of summary judgment in 
defendants' favor is affirmed,. 
*., *-»~ "*- # •*V- 'A**' 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
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